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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, defendant-appellant Combes submit this petition for 
rehearing in order to raise certain points the Court's 
September 24, 1990 majority opinion (a copy of which is 
attached hereto in the Addendum) overlooked or misapprehended. 
In particular, the opinion shows that there were genuine issues 
of material fact the Court overlooked in determining that, as a 
matter of law, plaintiff-appellee Breuer-Harrison's delay in 
asserting the claim for recission was not unreasonable or in 
bad faith. 
Although the Court's opinion purported to construe the 
record in the light most favorable to the Combes, the Court 
failed to do so. Instead, the Court weighed competing 
evidence, determined the credibility of witnesses, and 
generally acted as a finder of fact. The Court's opinion also 
recited direct and circumstantial evidence from which a finder 
of fact could reasonably have concluded that Breuer-Harrison*s 
delay was unreasonable, and that the pipeline easement was only 
a pretext for a decision to rescind based on a failing real 
estate market. 
The Court's legal analysis also overlooked the 
difference between waiver of a contract breach and waiver of a 
particular equitable remedy, recission, for that breach. Also 
overlooked was the $15,000 received by Breuer-Harrison on an 
attempted sale of the property, which amount should have been 
deducted from the amount awarded as recissionary damages. 
Upon rehearing, the Combes respectfully urge the Court 
to reverse the summary judgment in favor of Breuer-Harrison and 
remand for trial on the issues of reasonableness and good 
faith. Alternatively, the Court should direct the District 
Court to reduce the recissionary damage award by $15,000. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT'S OPINION OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED 
FACTUAL ISSUES OF REASONABLENESS AND GOOD FAITH 
CREATED BY BREUER-HARRISON'S DELAY IN ASSERTING 
THE RECISSION CLAIM. 
At page 9 of its opinion, the Court correctly noted 
that a summary judgment may be affirmed only if "no genuine 
issue of material fact exists,M when viewing "the facts and 
. . . the evidence in the -light most favorable to the losing 
party" (citations omitted). In reviewing a summary judgment, 
the appellate court is reguired to apply the same standards as 
the lower court. See, Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 
1977). Accordingly, the court may not resolve conflicts in 
evidence or make judgments about the credibility of witnesses 
whose demeanor the court has had no opportunity to observe. 
See, Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975). Even one 
sworn statement is sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Id. 
The party against whom summary judgment is awarded 
must also be given the benefit of all inferences that may 
reasonably be drawn from the evidence. See, Frederick May & 
Co. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962). Otherwise, 
that party is improperly prevented from proving its case by 
circumstantial evidence. See, Petricevich v. Salmon River 
Canal Co., Inc., 452 P.2d 362 (Ida. 1969). Summary judgment 
may be affirmed only if reasonable minds could not differ as to 
the factual issues presented. Id. 
The Court properly applied these principles in 
reversing the summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee 
Froerer on the Combes' legal malpractice claims. However, the 
Court failed to apply these principles in affirming the summary 
judgment in favor of the Breuer-Harrison recission claims. 
A. Factual Issues Concerning When Breuer-Harrison 
Learned of the Pipeline or Easement. 
In order to determine whether a delayed claim of 
recission has been asserted reasonably and in good faith, the 
first issue that must be addressed (and the first issue that 
was addressed in the Court's opinion) is the length of the 
delay.—/ Obviously, the longer the delay, the less likely it 
is to be reasonable. Here, did Breuer-Harrison wait five years 
before rescinding as the dissent concluded or eighteen months 
1/ The Court's opinion cites Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123 
(Utah 1984) for the proposition that title defects known to 
the buyer prior to a purchase of real property may be the 
basis for the buyer's claim for recission, where the seller 
is obligated to convey title by a warranty deed that does 
not exclude the known defects. However, the question 
presented here that was not addressed in Bergstrom is: How 
long may the buyer wait before asserting that recission 
claim? Thus, despite Bergstrom, the factual issue of the 
extent of the pre-purchase knowledge of the pipeline or 
easement by Breuer-Harrison or its agents remains critical 
to this case. 
as the majority apparently decided?-' This is a fact issue 
not only upon which reasonable minds could differ, but upon 
which reasonable minds on this Court did differ, as evidenced 
by the dissenting opinion. 
In charging Breuer-Harrison with knowledge from 1983, 
rather than from 1979, the majority opinion reversed, the 
applicable standard of review, by construing the evidence and 
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to 
Breuer-Harrison, rather than to the Combes. For example, the 
Court's opinion admits at p. 12! that Keil knew of the pipeline 
prior to the 1979 purchase by Breuer-Harrison and at p. 2 that 
Keil was a partner in the development. Yet, the Court 
concludes that Breuer-Harrison didn't learn of the pipeline 
until 1983. This distinction is meaningless because Keil was 
Breuer-Harrison's agent, as was Great Basin Engineering, which 
also knew of the pipeline prior to the purchase. The Court 
apparently overlooked the rule that a principal is charged with 
the knowledge of its agent. See, FMA Financial Corp. v. Hansen 
Dairy, Inc., 617 P.2d 327 (Utah 1980). 
Similarly, the Court's attempt to distinguish 
knowledge of the pipeline from knowledge of the easement is 
also a distinction without a difference. All of the proposed 
2/ It is not entirely clear what the majority decided on this 
issue, since at page 12, the Court finds Breuer-Harrison 
learned of the easement in 1983, but on page 13, speaks of 
a five-year delay in asserting recission. 
subdivision drawings, maps or plats prepared by Great Basin 
showed the pipeline or "aqueduct", and Great Basin assumed 
there was an easement at least 20-30 feet wide that would have 
to be taken into account in developing the property. See, 
Court's opinion at pp. 3-4. Knowledge of the "waterline" prior 
to the purchase certainly gave Breuer-Harrison or its agents a 
duty to inquire further to determine the extent of the problem 
it might present later. See, Salt Lake, Garfield & Western 
Railway Co. v. Allied Materials Co., 4 Utah 2d 218, 291 P.2d 
883 (1955). Ultimately it was the depth of the pipeline, not 
accurately shown by the public records, rather than the width 
of the easement, that became the major problem. Deposition of 
Nielson (R. 1420) pp. 101-102. In essence, at the time of 
purchase, Keil, and Great Basin especially, knew as much about 
the easement as they would have if it had been excluded from 
the warranties of title. 
In accepting at face value the deposition testimony of 
Breuer, Harrison and their agents concerning knowledge of the 
pipeline or eastment, this Court simply assumed they were 
truthful, credible witnesses.—y However, a finder of fact 
could reasonably conclude otherwise. For example, is it 
3/ At page 7, n. 2, the Court also addresses the credibility 
of Keith Combe. Again, such assessments are for the finder 
of fact. Moreover, the issue of when Combe learned of the 
pipeline is irrelevant to the issue of when Breuer-Harrison 
or its agents learned of it. 
credible that a sophisticated real estate agent like Keil would 
think that there would be a pipeline without a corresponding 
easement? Pages 79-80 of his deposition (R. 1412) suggest he 
assumed there was an easement and understood the ramifications 
an easement might present for development. Both Anderson and 
Olsen at Great Basin also assumed there was such an easement, 
as the Court pointed out at p. 3 of its opinion. 
Also, at page 12 of its opinion, the Court states that 
"[t]here is no evidence that prior to executing the contract, 
Breuer or Harrison saw the base sheet or any sketches traced 
from the base sheet showing the pipeline". However, there is 
at least circumstantial evidence in the record to the 
contrary. See, Deposition of Keil (R. 1412) at pp.23-29, 
41-42; Deposition of Anderson (R. 1415) pp. 23-25; Deposition 
of Olsen, pp. 22-32, 48. 
At page 12 of its opinion, the Court states that 
H[e]ven after exhaustive discovery and deposition testimony, 
the evidence does not contradict or cast any doubt on the 
developers' testimony" regarding when they knew of the 
pipeline. As shown above, this is simply not the case. 
Moreover, this represents the very weighing of evidence and 
determinations of credibility that the standard of review 
applicable to summary judgment, precludes. The Court's opinion 
itself recites sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence 
from which a finder of fact could reasonably conclude that 
Breuer-Harrison waited five years before deciding to rescind. 
The Court simply overlooked the effect this evidence could have 
on a finder of fact being asked to determine whether 
Breuer-Harrison acted reasonably and in good faith. 
B. Factual Issues Regarding Whether Breuer-
Harrison Acted Reasonably and in Good Faith 
Upon Learning of the Easement. 
Even assuming Breuer-Harrison did not learn of the 
pipeline or easement until 1983, the Court's opinion at pp. 14 
and 15 raises numerous factual issues concerning good faith and 
reasonableness that could not properly be resolved by summary 
judgment. Here again, the Court either weighed competing 
evidence or ignored reasonable interpretations of the evidence 
to which the Combes were entitled. 
In finding that, as a matter of law, Breuer-Harrison 
acted in good faith, the Court overlooked its own statement at 
page 14 to the effect that the pipeline may not have been the 
real reason for recission: " . . . [A] plummeting real estate 
market may have precipitated B-H's decision to rescind the 
contract . . . " (emphasis added). In finding that, as a matter 
of law, Breuer-Harrison acted reasonably, the Court similarly 
overlooked another of its own statements, also on p. 14: ". . . 
B-H would have saved both parties considerable expense had it 
rescinded the contract immediately . . . " (emphasis added).—/ 
4^/ The Court's point that Breuer-Harrison' s delay not only 
failed to mitigate its damages, but actually increased both 
its and the Combes' damages, is an important one in a 
recission case. One of the reasons for requiring recission 
to be asserted promptly is that the longer the parties 
continue to perform the contract, the harder it becomes to 
return them to the pre-contract status quo. 
The Court goes on to note, again at p. 14, that, 
" . . . it is sound policy to not blindly require a 
non-breaching party to rescind immediately . . . ". However, 
the issue is not whether Breuer-Harrison had to act 
immediately, but whether its delay was reasonable and in good 
faith, which are inherently factual issues. See, Mahurin v. 
Schmeck, 390 P.2d 576 (Ariz. 1964). Moreover, it it is also 
"sound policy" to let a finder of fact hear both sides of the 
story, rather than "blindly" accepting one version or the 
other, especially in light of the Court's own statements quoted 
above. 
Also on p. 14, the Court stated: "The complete impact 
of the pipeline easement was not known until further 
engineering work was completed and the development cost of the 
property became prohibitive in light of the pipeline 
easement." However, there is evidence in the record (referred 
to in the Court's opinion at p. 7) that the real reason the 
pipeline became a problem is because of regulations in effect 
at the time of purchase, of which Great Basin was aware, that 
the Weber Basin Conservancy District began enforcing on!v 
later. There is also evidence in the record (again aLuJcd to 
by the Court on p. 14) that if it became cost prohibitive to 
configure the project around the pipeline, it was only because 
of the "plummeting real estate market." 
In rejecting the Combes' estoppel claim at p. 15 of 
the opinion, the Court finds that there was no ". . . 
admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the [recission] 
claim afterwards asserted." The Court goes on to state that 
there is nothing in the record " . . . suggesting that Nielson 
told Keith Combe that they would look only to the title company 
and Froerer for any liability for the pipeline and that B-H 
would honor the terms of the contract, even with the 
easement." What Nielson, another partner in the project, did 
say is as follows: 
Q. Do you recall ever having a 
conversation with Keith about the lien or 
about the easement in particular? 
A. I do. We talked a few times about 
the problem. And I remember Keith 
mentioning that it isn't my problem, you 
know, it's Froerer's problem. That's when 
our focus of attention — and it never was 
on Keith. Because once we saw there on the 
title report that it was blatant how it had 
been missed, and once we found that out, 
then we started all of our focus of 
attention went from Keith right to Froerer. 
Deposition of Nielson, R. 1420, at p. 44 (emphasis added). 
Even Breuer-Harrison admits, at p. 6 of its brief, 
that it initially decided to look to Froerer and the title 
insurer ATGF rather than the Combes. Moreover, the Court's 
opinion states at p. 8 that "Nielson never told Keith [Combe] 
that the development would not proceed because of the 
easement." While the Court speculates about Breuer-Harrison's 
motive and intent on p. 15, again, these are factual issues. 
See, Hoke v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 375 P.2d 743 (Wash. 1962). 
Even if there had been no statements inconsistent with 
an intent to rescind, there certainly is evidence of 
inconsistent acts and omissions upon which the Combes 
detrimentally relied. Contrary to the Court's statement at 
page 6, Keith Combe did not approach Nielson with the new title 
report in 1983 for the purpose of obtaining concessions under 
the contract. Combe wanted to pledge his interest in the 
contract as security for a loan and needed to know whether 
Breuer-Harrison was going forward with the project. Deposition 
of Nielson (R. 1420) p. 42. As indicated above, Combe was not 
told the easement would halt the project, Instead, 
Breuer-Harrison continued to make payments-1' (upon which this 
Court has ruled pre-judgment interest must be awarded) and even 
requested and obtained two significant amendments to the 
purchase agreement after admitted knowledge of the easement. 
While, as discussed below, these inconsistent acts 
might not estop a damage claim, in an anticipatory breach case, 
they certainly constitute a reasonable basis for a finder of 
5/ The Court's analysis of the restitutionary damage issue 
overlooks the $15,000 received by Breuer-Harrison when it 
attempted to sell the property, which amount should have 
been credited against the damage award. See the Combes' 
opening brief at pp. 14-15 and 44 
n n _ 
fact to find estoppel or laches as to a recission claim. "A 
party cannot retain the fruits of the contract while awaiting 
future developments to determine whether it will be more 
profitable to affirm or disaffirm." Porras v. Bass, 665 P.2d 
1249, 1251 (Ore. App. 1983). 
In sum, there was ample evidence in the record, some 
of which the Court overlooked, and some of which the Court 
referred to and then proceeded to ignore, creating genuine 
issues of material fact concerning whether Breuer-Harrison 
acted unreasonably or in bad faith in belatedly asserting the 
recission remedy. 
II. 
THE COURT'S LEGAL ANALYSIS OVERLOOKED THE DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN WAIVER OF A CONTRACT BREACH AND WAIVER OF 
RECISSION AS ONE REMEDY FOR THAT BREACH. 
The Court's legal analysis of the waiver issue 
overlooks the distinction between a waiver of the alleged 
anticipatory breach of contract and a waiver or election of a 
particular remedy for the alleged anticipatory breach, in this 
case the remedy of recission. United California Bank v. 
Prudential Insurance Co., 681 P.2d 390, 433 (Ariz. App. 1983) 
and Upland Indus. Corp. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 6S4 
P.2d 638, 643 (Utah 1984), cited by the Court at p. 13, both 
involve only the issue of whether the anticipatory breach was 
waived. Neither case involved claims for recission. 
This oversight continues on p. 14, where the Court 
asserts that attempts to mitigate damages would justify 
Breuer-Harrison*s delay in asserting recission. This is simply 
not the case. At the time Breuer-Harrison learned of the 
pipeline or easement, even assuming this occurred in 1983, it 
had to make an election, especially since it knew the 
encumbrance could not be remedied. Breuer-Harrison could elect 
to affirm the contract, attempt to mitigate its damages, and 
sue for damages later if this attempt was unsuccessful, or it 
could elect to rescind. See, Pickinpaugh v. Morton, 519 P.2d 
91 (Ore. 1974). It could not do both. Moreover, there is 
evidence in the record, referred to in the Court's opinion at 
p. 7, that Breuer-Harrison made a conscious decision not to 
rescind in 1983, upon the advice of one of its partners, 
Nielson. 
If, as the Court postulated, Breuer-Harrison elected 
to mitigate its damages, then it also elected damages as its 
remedy, not recission. By making that election, 
Breuer-Harrison may have preserved its right to sue for damages 
later, but it waived any right to later assert the inconsistent 
remedy of recission. 
CONCLUSION 
Because recission is an equitable remedy, a finder of 
fact must consider all of the surrounding facts and 
circumstances in reaching the ultimate decision of whether it 
is fair to allow this remedy. This Court overlooked numerous 
facts and circumstances that make recission unfair here. More 
importantly, this Court overlooked that it is not its 
prerogative to make this factual inquiry. 
The Combes respectfully urge that their petition for 
rehearing be granted and that the Breuer-Harrison recission 
claims be remanded for trial. At minimum, the recissionary 
damage award must be reduced by $15,000. 
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Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Orme. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Appellants Keith and Evelyn Combe appeal the trial 
court's summary judgment for appellees, Breuer-Harrison, Inc. 
(B-H), Casper J. Breuer, and William Harrison, against the 
Combes for anticipatory repudiation of a real estate contract 
entered into by the parties. The Combes also appeal the trial 
court's summary judgment dismissing the Combes' cross claims 
against appellees Attorneys' Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. (ATGF) 
and Robert Froerer. We affirm in part and reverse and remand 
in part. 
The property in question is an undeveloped parcel of 
approximately twenty acres located in south Ogden, Utah. It 
was originally part of a farm developed by Keith Combe's 
grandfather. In the early 1960s, the Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy District (Weber Basin), by condemnation 
proceedings, obtained a thirty-foot wide easement on the 
property and constructed a water pipeline within the confines 
of the easement. Sometime in the 1970s, Keith Combe's mother 
divided the property into four parcels, conveying a parcel each 
to Keith Combe and his three siblings. One of the parcels 
distributed to Keith Combe's siblings was held in a trust 
managed by First Security Bank (Bank). 
In 1979, Breuer and Harrison, the sole stockholders in 
B-H, a California corporation, became interested in purchasing 
property in Utah for development projects. They contacted 
Steve Keil, an Ogden real estate agent, who showed them several 
large parcels of property in the Ogden area. One of the 
properties they examined was the property owned by Combe and 
his siblings. Keil, Breuer, and Harrison walked across the 
Combe property and examined the county plat maps and available 
demographic and economic data. 
Sometime in August 1979, Breuer and Harrison entered 
into an oral agreement with Keil, Bruce Nielson, who owned the 
real estate firm where Keil worked, and Duane Bruce, another 
agent for the firm. They agreed that Keil, Nielson, and Bruce 
would have a twenty-five percent equity interest in the Combe 
property after a proposed purchase. The three were to share 
with B-H the costs, expenses, and all required payments under 
the Combe contract. A "memorandum of understanding" outlining 
the terms of the agreement was drafted and signed by all five 
individuals sometime in December 1979. 
In August 1979, Keil contacted Jay Anderson, owner of 
an engineering firm, Great Basin Engineering (GBE), and asked 
Anderson to sketch some subdivision layouts of the Combe 
property. To assist B-H in determining the suitability of the 
Combe property as a residential subdivision, GBE subsequently 
performed, prior to B-H's purchase of the property, a variety 
of engineering tasks, including extensive soil testing, on-site 
ground water analysis, runoff flow analysis, and placement of 
road alignment. 
Anderson assigned the actual design sketch work to 
Charles Olsen, an engineer at GBE. Olsen first prepared a base 
sheet by tracing information from a Weber County topography 
map. The base sheet showed the property boundaries, 
surrounding subdivisions, streets, and a dotted line marked 
"Aqueduct,"1 crossing the property diagonally in a northwest 
direction. By placing tracing paper over the base sheet, Olsen 
prepared several different sketches. 
Because of the aqueduct marking, Olsen assumed there 
was an easement and asked Anderson the size of the easement, 
since Olsen typically included such information on a drawing. 
Olsen testified in deposition that Anderson told him the 
information was not available, to just go ahead and prepare the 
sketches. Olsen made no further attempt to determine the size 
of the easement. He did, however, make allowance for the 
aqueduct or pipeline, by putting a roadway over the top of it 
on the plat maps. He also testified that had he known of the 
thirty-foot easement, he would have plotted it on the base 
sheet. 
Anderson was aware of the pipeline since its 
installation on the Combe property in the early 1960s. He 
testified in deposition that the aqueduct marking was 
originally put on Weber County aerial surveys in 1963. At the 
time Keil contacted him in 1979, Anderson believed there was 
probably a twenty to thirty-foot easement that belonged to 
1. According to Anderson, the marking of "Aqueduct" on the 
base sheet was inappropriate since it was really an underground 
pipeline. Webster's defines "aqueduct" as a conduit or 
artificial channel for conveying water; one for carrying a 
large quantity of water which flows by gravitation. Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary 108 (1986). Webster's 
defines "pipeline" as a line of pipe connected to pumps, 
valves, and control devices for conveying, in part, liquids. 
Id. at 1722. 
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Weber Basin, but was unaware of the exact width. Anderson 
understood that a house could not be built on the pipeline but 
assumed that either a roadway or back lot line could be put on 
the pipeline. Prior to B-H's purchase of the Combe property, 
Anderson worked primarily with Keil. 
From exhaustive testimony, it is clear that in 
September 1979, Keil was aware of what he considered a small 
waterline which traversed the Combe property. It is also clear 
that Keil did not learn of the pipeline easement until 1983. 
Keil testified in deposition that his recollection of what he 
knew of the waterline in September 1979 was hazy due to it 
being a "nonissue." He testified that the biggest concerns in 
his discussions with Anderson in the fall of 1979 regarding the 
Combe property involved sewage and drainage problems. Although 
the exact time is uncertain, sometime in September 1979, 
Anderson apparently talked with Keil about the waterline or 
pipeline and putting a roadway over it. Keil viewed the 
waterline as a minor problem in the development plans, one that 
could easily be accomodated by building a road over it to 
insure profitability. According to Keil, in 1983 he first 
learned of an easement and aqueduct, which he did not relate to 
the waterline because in his mind there was a significant size 
difference between the two. Anderson testified in deposition 
that he told Keil that the pipeline was relatively small 
compared to usual Weber Basin standards. He also testified 
that there was no way Keil would have known of the thirty-foot 
easement in 1979. 
On September 19, 1979, a meeting was held with Breuer, 
Harrison, Keil, and Olsen in attendance. This was Breuer1s and 
Harrison's first contact with GBE. The group reviewed Olsen1s 
rough sketches and discussed the number of lots, location of 
road alignment, and water treatment, sewage, and drainage 
problems. None of those in attendance at the meeting recall 
which sketches were analyzed. There is no evidence that the 
base sheet showing "AqueductM was shown to Breuer, Harrison, or 
Keil. Breuer and Harrison testified in deposition that an 
easement was not discussed at the meeting and that the first 
they heard of the pipeline and easement was in 1983. Olsen had 
no recollection of what was discussed at the meeting. Keil 
testified to having no independent recollection of ever talking 
with either Breuer or Harrison regarding a waterline or 
pipeline either at this meeting or at any time prior to 1983, 
but only conjectured that a waterline was probably a topic of 
conversation at some time. He specifically testified that he 
did not discuss with Breuer or Harrison an easement at any time 
prior to 1983. 
Sometime in the fall of 1979, Keil contacted Robert E, 
Froerer, an Ogden attorney, and asked him to do certain legal 
work in connection with a real estate transaction involving 
property in Ogden. Froerer prepared the necessary legal 
documents, deeds, and exchange agreements, that enabled a 
series of property trades between Keith Combe and his siblings 
so that Keith Combe and the Bank would end up with the entire 
property. Froerer also drafted a preliminary purchase 
agreement which was executed by B-H on approximately November 
1, 1979. Froerer then prepared a real estate contract for the 
Combe property which established a sales price of $410,880 and 
required a down payment of $75,000. Beginning on December 31, 
1980, and continuing for the next three years, B-H was to make 
annual interest-only payments. The balance of the purchase 
price was due in full on December 31, 1983. 
Paragraph eight of the real estate contract required 
the Combes and the Bank to warrant title to the property, to 
furnish a title policy, and to convey the property by warranty 
deeds. The paragraph was nearly identical to paragraph 
fourteen in the preliminary purchase agreement. Paragraph 
eight of the contract reads as follows: 
Seller warrants that there are no liens 
or encumbrances on the property 
herein-above described and agrees to 
furnish to Buyer at Seller's expense a 
title policy showing good and marketable 
title in said property (said title policy 
to be furnished at the time of the receipt 
of down payment from Buyer). Further, 
Seller agrees to execute and deliver to 
Buyer, or assigns, good and sufficient 
warranty deeds covering title to the 
above-described property when subdivided 
and as paid for in accordance with the 
terms hereinabove set out. 
Paragraph four required that an escrow account be set 
up, that the Combes convey title by warranty deed to an escrow 
agent to be named later, and that this agent convey title to 
B-H by special warranty deed as payments were made. Paragraph 
five, which disclaimed warranties, stated: "The Seller hereby 
expressly disclaims any and all warranties and representations, 
express or implied, as to the state of the property, its 
condition, quality, character, or suitability or 
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fitness for any sue [sic], whether existing or contemplated, 
matters of zoning, or in other respect.M 
Keil testified in deposition that on one occasion 
prior to the closing, he went with Keith Combe to the office of 
Combe's personal attorney, Paul Kunz. Kunz reviewed documents, 
including the preliminary purchase agreement, and made some 
changes. Keil further testified that Keith Combe was adamant 
about Kunz reviewing the documents prior to Keith signing 
anything. 
The sale closed on December 29, 1979. Froerer was not 
present at the closing, but later obtained B-H's signature on 
the real estate contract and the down payment, and forwarded 
funds to the Combes and the Bank. Froerer withdrew payment for 
his fees for drafting the contracts, and for fees for a title 
search and policy, from the sale proceeds. An escrow account 
was never established and no preliminary title report was 
requested or issued prior to the closing of the sale. Keith 
Combe, in deposition, testified that he first learned that 
Froerer was going to issue title insurance at the closing. 
According to Froerer, the title search was probably started 
before the closing. The title policy was, however, not issued 
until November 14, 1980. The policy failed to make an 
exception for the pipeline easement. The underwriter on the 
policy issued by Froerer was ATGF. At the time, Froerer owned 
stock in ATGF and regularly researched titles and wrote title 
insurance for the company. 
After the real estate contract was signed, GBE added 
sewers and utilities to the subdivision layout. GBE completed 
the final plat in January 1980, which placed a roadway over the 
pipeline. In 1980, after a proposed sale of the property to a 
third party failed to materialize, the developers continued to 
develop their plans for the property, which consisted primarily 
of obtaining governmental approval for the subdivision. Most 
of the development work was done by Nielson, Bruce, and Keil. 
On November 24, 1982, an amendment was executed by the 
parties, that gave the developers an additional two years to 
pay the principal balance of the purchase price. A second 
amendment was executed on January 3, 1983, This amendment 
deferred for six months payment of one-half of the $35,000 
interest payment which had been due at the end of 1982. 
In the spring of 1983. .in the process of negotiating a 
concession for himself in the '-tract, Keith Combe visited 
Nielson's office, bringing a r w title report with him. The 
£ 
report disclosed several easements that had not been disclosed 
on the title report issued by Froerer, including the pipeline 
easement. Breuer, Harrison, Nielson, Brian, and Keil all 
testified that this was the first time they had heard of the 
pipeline easement.2 
Anderson testified in deposition that after the 
disclosure of the pipeline easement on the Combe title report, 
he discovered and communicated to Nielson that Weber Basin was 
more rigorously enforcing its pipeline easements. Anderson 
further testified that had he known in 1979 of a thirty-foot 
easement and the restrictions that are now enforced, he would 
have advised Keil that the property would be difficult to 
develop, the cost would be high, and that Keil should look for 
another piece of ground. 
According to Anderson's testimony, the existence of 
the thirty-foot easement and its enforced restrictions prohibit 
developing the property. Apparently, Breuer and Harrison 
wanted to get out of the project after learning of the 
easement, but Nielson convinced them to continue developing 
ideas to work around the easement. Bingham Engineering 
explored and platted the concept of developing the property as 
a condominium project. According to Breuer and Nielson, the 
placement of houses over the easement would create special 
problems if a developer wanted to cross the easement with 
utilities; hamper efforts in gaining approval to dig around the 
pipeline; place restrictions on the backfill over the pipeline; 
require the property owner to make repairs to the pipeline; 
render fifteen feet of the property on either side of the 
pipeline unusable for anything except vegetation; and will 
likely require special bridging or a concrete cover to be 
placed over any portion of the pipeline that sits within a 
street. 
2. The parties dispute as to when the Combes first learned of 
the pipeline easement. Breuer, Harrison, and Keil all 
testified that at their meeting with Keith Combe in August 
1984, Keith Combe mentioned to them that he recalled his father 
telling him about the pipeline. Keith Combe testified in 
deposition, however, that he never knew there was a pipeline on 
the property prior to its disclosure in the 1983 title report. 
In trial, Keith Combe admitted recalling his father talking 
about the water conservancy district filing a condemnation 
action to take a portion of the property for an aqueduct 
easement. 
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Following disclosure of the easement in the new title 
report, Harrison, Breuer, and Nielson contacted Froerer to 
determine what he and ATGF intended to do to resolve the 
problem. Nielson also met with Keith Combe several times 
following the pipeline easement disclosure. Although Keith 
Combe was generally aware of the problems the easement 
presented, he opined that it was Froerer*s problem and not 
his. Nielson never told Keith that the development would not 
proceed because of the easement. 
In late 1983 or early 1984, the developers hired a new 
engineering firm, Bingham Engineering, to obtain "fresh 
ideas." The complete impact of the easement on the project was 
not known until Bingham Engineering had completed much of its 
work and the cost of continuing the project became prohibitive, 
particularly in light of disclosures about the width of the 
right-of-way and the depth of the pipeline. 
Two additional amendments were executed between the 
parties in February 1984. The first stated that at least 
fifteen acres of the property would be developed as 
condominiums and partial payments would be made to the Combes 
as each unit was sold. Further, the Combes were required to 
subordinate their interest in part of the property so that the 
developers could obtain a construction loan. The second 
amendment further extended the final payment under the contract 
until December 31, 1988, if the developers had paid at least 
$120,000 in principal by the end of 1985. 
In August 1984, Breuer and Harrison flew to Utah and 
for the first time personally met with Keith Combe and raised 
the option of rescinding the contract. Keith Combe refused to 
reduce the purchase price of the property to reflect its 
diminished value because of the easement. Shortly thereafter, 
B-H filed suit, seeking to rescind the contract and collect the 
money paid to the Combes on the contract. 
The Combes filed cross claims against Froerer and 
ATGF. In their first cause of action, they sought damages 
against Froerer based upon his negligence as an attorney; in 
their second cause of action, they sought damages against 
Froerer and ATGF based upon the issuance of the title insurance 
policy. 
The trial court granted B-H's summary judgment motion 
against the Combes, ruling that the Combes had committed 
anticipatory breach of the warranties of title in the real 
estate contract. The trial court later granted summary 
judgment against the Combes dismissing their claims against 
Froerer and ATGF. A trial was held but was limited to 
determining the amount of restitution to be received by B-H 
from the Combes. On the day before trial, the trial court 
bifurcated B-H's claims against Froerer and ATGF, over the 
Combes* objection. The jury which was empanelled in an 
advisory capacity, was discharged, and the trial court in a 
directed verdict determined the restitutionary damages against 
the Combes. The Combes, including Keith's brother, Clair, were 
required to refund B-H $236,966.21, plus pay $133,192.64 in 
prejudgment interest. The court credited the Combes $7,500 for 
the fair rental value of the property as agricultural property. 
On appeal, the Combes argue that the trial court erred 
in (1) awarding B-H summary judgment on their rescission 
claims; (2) summarily disposing of the Combes1 cross claims 
against Froerer and ATGF; (3) ordering that B-H's damage claims 
against Froerer and ATGF be severed from B-H's claims for 
restitutionary damages against the Combes; and (4) calculating 
restitutionary damages and offsets. 
The standard of review when considering a challenge to 
summary judgment is well settled. "A grant of summary judgment 
is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact 
exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.M Ceco v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969 
(Utah 1989); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). We construe the 
facts and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
losing party. Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 648, 
649 (Utah 1986); Whatcott v. Whatcott, 790 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). Further, when reviewing conclusions of law on 
a challenge to summary judgment, we review those conclusions 
for correctness, according no deference to the trial court's 
legal conclusions. Ceco, 772 P.2d at 969; Bonham v. Morgan, 
102 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (Utah 1989) (per curiam). 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT: BREUER-HARRISON 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-12 (1990) specifies the effect 
of a warranty deed as follows: 
Such deed when executed as required by 
law shall have the effect of a conveyance 
in fee simple . . . with covenants from 
the grantor . . . that the premises are 
free from all encumbrances . . . . Any 
exceptions to such covenants may be 
briefly inserted in such deed following 
the description of the land. 
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MAn 'encumbrance,1 as used in this section, is any right that a 
third party holds in land which constitutes a burden or 
limitation upon the rights of the fee title holder." Berostrom 
v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah 1984). The Combes concede 
that the pipeline easement is irremediable. MA defect which, 
by its nature cannot be removed by the seller as a practical 
matter is one 'of such a nature that the vendor neither has 
title nor in a practical sense any prospect of acquiring it.1" 
Neves v. Wright, 638 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Utah 1981) (quoting Davis 
v. Dean Vincent, Inc., 255 Or. 233, 465 P.2d 702, 706 (1970)). 
Thus, there is no question that the pipeline easement in this 
case constitutes a substantial encumbrance on the fee title to 
the property within the meaning of the statute. See Berostrom, 
677 P.2d at 1125 n.l (one of the three easements constituting 
encumbrances was a thirty-foot easement traversing the property 
in favor of the Weber Basin Water Conversancy District, beneath 
which lay a thirty-six inch water line); see also Thackeray v. 
Kniaht, 57 Utah 21, 192 P. 263, 265 (1920) (an easement for a 
pipeline over the premises is an encumbrance). 
It is well settled that an action may be maintained 
for breach of contract based upon the anticipatory repudiation 
by one of the parties to the contract. Hurwitz v. David K. 
Richards Co., 20 Utah 2d 232, 436 P.2d 794, 796 (1968). An 
anticipatory breach occurs when a party to an executory 
contract manifests a positive and unequivocal intent to not 
render its promised performance when the time fixed for it in 
the contract arrives. Ifl. The trial court determined that 
because the Combes could not convey unencumbered fee title to 
the property to B-H as required by the real estate contract, 
the Combes were guilty of anticipatory breach of the contract. 
We agree. Notwithstanding that no breach of the covenant 
against encumbrances will occur until the deed is actually 
delivered,3 it plainly appears that because of the pipeline 
easement the Combes would not be able to perform their 
contract, constituting an anticipatory repudiation of the real 
estate contract. 
The trial court correctly determined that rescission 
was the appropriate remedy for B-H. The Utah Supreme Court has 
clearly established that where an unexcepted encumbrance on a 
seller's title is irremediable and, as a consequence, the 
seller will not be able to fulfill its contract to convey title 
as described in the warranty deed, recission is an appropriate 
3. Generally, a vendor is allowed a reasonable time to perfect 
title. Callister v. Millstream Assocs., Inc., 738 P.2d 662, 
664 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
remedy. Berastrom, 677 P.2d at 1125; Neves, 638 P.2d at 1199; 
Thackeray, 192 P. at 266.4 
1. Waiver 
The Combes contend, however, that the trial court 
erred in granting summary judgment since a key unresolved 
factual dispute in this case is when B-H learned of the 
pipeline and easement. The Combes argue that viewed in the 
light most favorable to them, the record establishes that B-H 
or their local partners, Keil, Nielson, and Brian, knew of the 
pipeline and easement before they executed the contract with 
the Combes, since the drawings prepared by B-H's engineers 
showed the pipeline and easement. The Combes cite the trial 
court's acknowledgement in its order granting summary judgment 
that "[t]here is a dispute of fact as to the exact date at 
which the buyers became aware of the existence of the easement 
and became aware of the existence of the aquaduct [sic]." The 
Combes conclude if B-H knew or had notice of the pipeline and 
easement prior to execution of the real estate contract, it 
waived any rights of rescission for anticipatory breach of 
contract. See generally.Callister v. Millstream Assocs., Inc.. 
738 P.2d 662, 664 n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); 77 Am. Jur. 2d 
Vendor & Purchaser § 120 (1975) (the rule that a vendee's 
notice of encumbrances upon the property does not relieve the 
vendor of the duty of removing the encumbrance, where he or she 
4. Where there is an anticipatory repudiation, rescission of 
the contract is one of three options available to the 
non-breaching party in common law as well as under Utah law. 
The Utah Supreme Court has articulated these three options as 
follows: 
1. Treat the entire contract as broken 
and sue for damages. 
2. Treat the contract as still binding 
and wait until the time arrived for its 
performance and at such time bring an 
action on the contract. 
3. Rescind the contract and sue for money 
paid or for value of the services or 
property furnished. 
Hurwitz v. David K. Richards & Co., 20 Utah 2d 232, 436 P.2d 
794, 796 (1968). 
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contracts to convey free of all encumbrances, applies only to 
removable encumbrances, not to unremovable encumbrances, such 
as building restrictions or restrictions on the use of the 
property). 
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
Combes, however, we find no genuine issue of material fact with 
regard to when Breuer and Harrison and their local partners 
learned of the pipeline and easement. The testimony of Breuer, 
Harrison, Nielson, and Bruce all clearly establish that they 
did not know of the pipeline or the easement until sometime in 
1983. Keil was aware of what he termed a NwaterlineN prior to 
the execution of the real estate contract, but considered it 
only a minor impediment to the development of the property for 
housing units. Keil testified that he never disclosed the 
waterline to Breuer or Harrison and that he also did not learn 
of the easement until 1983. Even after exhaustive discovery 
and deposition testimony, the evidence does not contradict or 
cast any doubt on the developers' testimony. Breuer and 
Harrison walked across the property but, according to Anderson, 
neither the pipeline nor any physical manifestations of the 
pipeline were visible to the eye. Although "AqueductM was 
marked on the base sheet prepared by Olsen, there was no plat 
map or sketch created by GBE prior to 1983 that disclosed the 
existence of an easement. There is no evidence that prior to 
executing the contract, Breuer or Harrison saw the base sheet 
or any sketches traced from the base sheet showing the 
pipeline. Anderson's and Olsen*s testimony reinforce our 
conclusion that GBE did not fully appreciate the ramifications 
of the pipeline easement and never communicated to B-H the 
existence of a pipeline easement. Admittedly, the trial court 
found in dispute the exact date that B-H learned of the 
pipeline easement. However, because B-H clearly did not learn 
of the easement until well after the execution of the contract, 
this dispute does not involve a material fact. Because there 
is no genuine issue of material fact that B-H lacked knowledge 
of the pipeline on or before December 31, 1979, we find that it 
did not waive any rights to title without encumbrances when it 
executed the contract with the Combes. 
Even if B-H had knowledge of the irremediable easement 
or, as the dissent postulates, constructive notice under Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-3-2 (1990), the Combes would still be subject to 
the statutory covenant against encumbrances under section 
57-1-12. In Berostrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1984), the 
Utah Supreme Court noted that the unexcepted encumbrances on 
appellants' title, which included, as in this case, the Weber 
Basin waterline easement, which presumably was duly recorded, 
were irremediable. Although the supreme court found that it 
was undisputed that respondent had no knowledge or notice of at 
least one of the easements, the court stated that M[e]ven if 
respondent knew of some of the easements (as claimed by 
appellants), mere knowledge of encumbrances of this nature 
would not be sufficient to exclude them from the operation of 
the statutory covenant against encumbrances." 1^. at 1125. 
The Combes assert, however, that even if the 
developers did not learn of the pipeline and easement until 
1983, their five-year delay in asserting rescission for the 
Combes* anticipatory breach raised additional factual issues of 
waiver that could not be resolved by summary judgment. The 
Combes contend that during this five-year period, B-H 
reaffirmed its commitment to the contract by (1) paying annual 
interest payments, (2) hiring a new engineering firm to explore 
fresh ideas of developing the property, and (3) Nielson telling 
Keith Combe that B-H would hold only ATGF and Froerer liable 
for the breach and would honor the terms of the contract. 
,An original feature of the English doctrine of 
anticipatory breach was that a party continuing performance in 
the face of an anticipatory repudiation thereby waives the 
repudiation and can only sue on a subsequent breach, if any, 
occurring at the time when performance is due. 4 Corbin on 
Contracts § 981 (1951). The modern rule, however, "is that an 
innocent party, confronted with an anticipatory repudiation, 
may continue to treat the contract as operable and urge 
performance by the repudiating party without waiving any right 
to sue for that repudiation." United California Bank v. 
Prudential Ins. Co., Etc., 140 Ariz. 238, 681 P.2d 390, 433 
(Ct. App. 1983); sag, e,qt, Uplgnfl Inflyg, CPFPt v, Pggifig 
Gamble Robinson Co., 684 P.2d 638, 643 (Utah 1984); see also 4 
Corbin § 981 at 938-39. 
The basis for the modern rule, as the Combes point out 
in their reply brief, is to give the breaching party the 
opportunity to cure the breach before the time for performance 
is due. A party that has received a definite repudiation from 
the breaching party to the contract should not be penalized for 
its efforts to encourage the breaching party to perform its end 
of the bargain. United California Bank, 681 P.2d at 433. The 
repudiating party has a power of retraction as long as there 
has been no substantial change of position by the injured party 
and the nonbreaching party's continuing to urge performance may 
be properly held to keep this power of retraction alive. 4 
Corbin § 981 at 939. 
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The Combes contend that the rationale for the modern 
approach to anticipatory breach of contracts is inapplicable to 
the recission remedy as used in this case. Because the 
easement is incurable and they are unable to perform their end 
of the bargain, the Combes assert that there was no legal or 
rational basis to allow B-H to stall in rescinding the contract 
until the contract became unprofitable. In sum, the Combes 
argue that the executory real estate contract became no 
different than one on which performance had become due at the 
moment that B-H discovered the easement. At that point, B-H 
should have made an election, which they in effect did, argue 
the Combes, by affirming the contract. 
The Combes' argument that the nonbreaching party, in 
appropriate circumstances, ought to rescind without delay, in 
order to be able to mitigate damages, is admittedly 
persuasive. See University Club v. Invesco Holding Corp., 29 
Utah 2d 1, 504 P.2d 29, 30 (1972) ("where one party definitely 
indicates that he cannot or will not perform a condition of a 
contract, the other is not required to uselessly abide time, 
but may act upon the breached condition. Indeed in appropriate 
circumstances he ought to do so to mitigate damages."). 
However, even though the pipeline easement was incurable, the 
circumstances in this case did not demand immediate rescission 
of the contract by B-H. The complete impact of the pipeline 
easement was not known until further engineering work was 
completed and the development cost of the property became 
prohibitive in light of the pipeline easement. Further, 
although a plummeting real estate market may have precipitated 
B-H's decision to rescind the contract, contrary to the Combes' 
representations, the record is clear that B-H did not just sit 
on its rights following the disclosure of the easesment. B-H, 
through the efforts of Nielson, appropriately sought ways to 
mitigate the damage caused by the pipeline by attempting to 
develop the property in other ways. Although in hindsight, B-H 
would have saved both parties considerable expense had it 
rescinded the contract immediately upon disclosure of the 
easement, it is sound policy to not blindly require a 
non-breaching party to rescind immediately upon discovering the 
anticipatory breach. Even where the breach cannot be repaired, 
a non-breaching party may appropriately attempt in good faith 
to mitigate damages by attempting to honor the contract and 
work around problems presented by the breach. 
2. Estoppel/Laches 
The Combes also contend that B-H's delay in exercising 
its rescission rights raised material factual issues of 
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estoppel and laches not properly resolved by summary judgment. 
The Combes assert that only when real estate values plummeted 
in 1987, did B-H seek rescission. This delay, posit the 
Combes, precluded them from reselling the property, prior to 
the decline in property values, for an amount that would have 
made all parties whole. 
We have stated that 
[b]efore equitable estoppel may be 
applied, three elements must be present: 
1) an admission, statement, or act 
inconsistent with the claim afterwards 
asserted; 2) action by the other party on 
the faith of such admission, statement, or 
act; and 3) injury to such party resulting 
from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate such admission, 
statement, or act. Successful assertion 
of laches requires defendant to establish 
that plaintiff unreasonably delayed in 
bringing an action and that defendant was 
prejudiced by that delay. 
Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 751 
P.2d 270, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citation omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
We find that the Combes failed to demonstrate a 
factual dispute regarding the first element of estoppel: i.e., 
an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim 
afterwards asserted. Contrary to the Combes* representation, 
we do not find anything in the record of the summary judgment 
proceeding suggesting that Nielson told Keith Combe that they 
would look only to the title company and Froerer for any 
liability for the pipeline and that B-H would honor the terms 
of the contract even with the easement. As we have stated, 
B-H's delay in exercising its recission rights was due to its 
efforts to mitigate damages due to the pipeline and easement, 
not because they were relinquishing their later-asserted claim 
of recission. Further, since the delay was a reasonable 
attempt to work around the easement, we reject the Combes' 
laches claim. 
3. Contractual ambiguities 
The Combes also argue that the trial court improperly 
resolved factual issues created by ambiguities in the real 
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estate contract concerning the scope of warranties of title 
given by the Combes. The Combes assert that if the unnamed 
escrow agent, in accordance with paragraph four of the real 
estate contract, was to convey title by special warranty deed 
to B-H, such would not cover the pipeline easement created 
before the Combes took title. This argument is meritless since 
the Combes are clearly obligated under the real estate contract 
to provide a deed with no encumbrances on the property and a 
special warranty deed could not obviate that requirement. The 
Combes also contend that the warranties of title in paragraph 
eight conflict with the disclaimer of all warranties in 
paragraph five. We find, however, that the "as is" provisions 
contained in paragraph five relate to the physical condition of 
the property and have nothing to do with warranties of title as 
set forth in paragraph eight of the real estate contract. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT: MALPRACTICE CLAIM AGAINST FROERER 
We next turn to the Combes* argument that factual 
issues also barred the summary judgment dismissing the Combes* 
cross claims against Froerer. The Combes contend that Froerer 
committed legal malpractice by 1) failing to complete the title 
work prior to the real estate closing; 2) withholding material 
information from the Combes; and 3) by simultaneously 
representing another client with conflicting interests. 
Traditionally, in a legal malpractice action, the 
threshold question is whether an attorney-client relationship 
was established. Bergman v. New England Ins. Co., 872 F.2d 
672, 674 (5th Cir. 1989); Guillebeau v. Jenkins, 182 Ga. App. 
225, 355 S.E.2d 453, 456 (1987). Once this relationship is 
proven, the client has the burden of showing two additional 
elements: 1) negligence on the part of the attorney, and 2) 
that such negligence was the proximate cause of damage to the 
client. See, £-*J9L-# Dunn v. McKav, Burton, McMurrav & Thurman, 
584 P.2d 894, 896 (Utah 1978); see also Bergman, 872 F.2d at 
674; Guillebeau. 355 S.E.2d at 456. 
In general, except where an attorney is appointed by a 
court, the attorney-client relationship is created by 
contract. Franko v. Mitchell, 158 Ariz. 391, 762 P.2d 1345, 
1351 (Ct. App. 1988); Fox v. Pollack, 181 Cal. App. 3d 954, 226 
Cal. Rptr. 532, 534 (1986). The contract may be express or 
implied from the conduct of the parties. Maroulies bv 
Maraulies y. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985). The 
relationship is proved by showing that the party seeks and 
receives the advice of the lawyer in matters pertinent to the 
i a 
lawyer's profession. People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510, 517 
(Colo. 1986) (en banc); Steinbach v. Meyer, 412 N.W.2d 917, 918 
(Iowa Ct. App. 1987). Such a showing is subjective in that a 
factor in evaluating the relationship is whether the client 
thought an attorney-client relationship existed. Matter of 
Lieber. 442 A.2d 153, 156 (D.C. 1982); Matter pf Petrie, 154 
Ariz. 295, 742 P.2d 796, 801 (1987) (en banc); Louisiana State 
Bar Ass'n v. Bosworth, 481 So.2d 567, 571 (La. 1986). However, 
a party's belief that an attorney-client relationship exists, 
unless reasonably induced by representations or conduct of the 
attorney, is not sufficient to create a confidential 
attorney-client relationship. Fox, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 535; see 
also Guillebeau, 355 S.E.2d at 458 ("An attorney-client 
relationship cannot be created unilaterally in the mind of a 
would-be client; a reasonable belief is required."). In sum, 
M[i]t is the intent and conduct of the parties which is 
critical to the formation of the attorney-client 
relationship." Hecht v. Superior Court. 192 Cal. App. 3d 560, 
237 Cal. Rptr. 528, 531 (1987). 
The Combes assert that Froerer understood that he had 
been hired by them to perform several tasks, including 1) the 
drafting of all documents for the transfer of parcels among the 
Combe siblings, 2) the drafting of preliminary and final real 
estate contracts with B-H, 3) conducting a title search, and 4) 
procuring the title insurance policy. Keith Combe testified in 
deposition that he always assumed Froerer was his attorney 
since he was going to be paying him money. Froerer did in fact 
pay his fees from the funds delivered to him in payment of the 
purchase price due to the Combes. 
Froerer claims, however, that he represented the 
buyers solely, not the Combes. He counters that merely because 
he was paid out of the proceeds of the sale does not establish 
an attorney-client relationship. He argues that such practice 
is common in real estate transactions and that the argument 
could be made that the sale proceeds were actually paid by B-H 
since they were the ones who deposited the money for closing.5 
5. Froerer also claims that the Combes' claims against him are 
barred by the four year statute of limitations under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-25 (1987). Since this issue was not presented 
first to the trial court for its consideration and resolution, 
we will not consider it. See State v. Webb, 760 P.2d 65, 71 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). Further, we note that a cause of action 
for legal malpractice accrues, and the four-year limitation 
commences to run, when the act complained of is discovered or, 
in the exercise of reasonable care, should have been 
discovered. Merkley v. Beaslin, 778 P.2d 16, 19 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) . 
880353-CA 1 n 
Although payment for legal services may be persuasive 
evidence that an attorney-client relationship was established, 
Foulke v. Knuck, 162 Ariz. 517, 784 P.2d 723, 726 (Ct. App. 
1989), there are exceptions. See, e.g.. Guillebeau, 355 S.E.2d 
at 457 (where party obligated herself to pay closing costs 
before anyone contacted attorney, she did not pay attorney's 
fee in the furtherance of a contract of legal employment and, 
therefore, no attorney-client relationship existed). However, 
the payment of attorney fees does not by itself determine 
whether an attorney-client relationship exists, but is only one 
indicia. Hecht, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 530; see also Huddleston v. 
State, 259 Ga. 45, 376 S.E.2d 683, 684 (1989) (although the 
general test of employment is the fee, the basic question with 
regard to an attorney-client relationship is whether advice or 
assistance of the attorney is both sought and received). 
In reviewing summary judgment, we must view the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the Combes, the party 
opposing summary judgment. Salt Lake City Corp. v. James 
Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1988'. Evidence 
presented to the court on this issue consisted mostly of 
deposition testimony. Keith Combe testified in deposition that 
he perceived the transaction of property trades between himself 
and his siblings as part of the sale to B-H and that he was not 
aware that Froerer was going to issue title insurance until at 
the closing when he learned that Froerer would perform the task 
at the request of Keil. The record further shows that the 
Combes had no prior contact with Froerer, they at no time 
sought Froerer's legal advice either before or after the 
closing, and Froerer was not present at the closing. Also, 
Keith Combe requested that another attorney, Kunz, review and 
make necessary changes in the preliminevv -.iocuments that 
Froerer drafted. Evidence supporting zence of an 
attorney-client relationship consists Keith Combe's 
testimony that he thought Froerer w?c -acting as his attorney; 
the type of documents prepared, including the transfers among 
the Combe siblings; and Froerer*s payment from the sale 
proceeds at closing. Viewing this evidence in a light most 
favorable to the Combes, we cannot say that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact entitling Froerer to summary judgment. 
It is only necessary for the nonmoving party to show "facts" 
controverting the "facts" asserted by the moving party. Id. 
We, therefore, reverse and remand on the factual issue of 
whether an attorney-client relationship existed between Froerer 
and the Combes. When that fundamental factual issue is 
determined, the trial court can proceed accordingly with 
respect to this transaction. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT: CONTRACTUAL & ABSTRACTOR NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS 
AGAINST FROERER & ATGF 
The Combes next argue that schedule A of the title 
insurance policy insures their interests as well as those of 
B-H, or was at least ambiguous on this point, rendering the 
intent of the parties a question of material fact. Schedule A 
states, in pertinent part: 
1. The estate or interest in the land 
described herein and which is covered by 
this policy is: An interest pursuant to 
that certain Uniform Real Estate Contract 
dated January 9, 1980, by and between 
KEITH P. COMBE and EVELYN, his wife, and 
FIRST SECURITY BANK N.A., Trustee, as 
Seller, and CASPER J. BREUER, and WILLIAM 
M. HARRISON, as Buyer. 
2. The estate or interest referred to 
herein is at Date of Policy vested in: 
Parcels #1 thru #4: Keith P. Combe and 
Evelyn Combe 
Parcel #5: First Security Bank N.A., 
Trustee, and Keith P. Combe and Evelyn. 
The Combes contend that paragraph one refers to the 
Combes1 interest, as well as to B-H's interest, since the 
Combes retained legal title to the property. If the policy 
were intended to insure only B-H, argue the Combes, paragraph 
one should have referred only to the "equitable estate" created 
by the real estate contract. The Combes also assert that the 
language in paragraph two, "estate or interest referred to 
herein" includes the Combes and fails to clearly state that 
B-Hfs interest only was insured. 
"Title insurance is a contract to indemnify the 
insured against loss through defects in the insured title or 
against liens or encumbrances that may affect the insured title 
at the time the policy is issued." Malinak v. Safeco Title 
Ins. Co. of Idaho, 661 P.2d 12, 14 (Mont. 1983). The 
determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is a question 
of law. Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 
1210, 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Thus, as we previously noted, 
we accord the trial court's interpretation no particular 
weight, reviewing its interpretation under a 
correction-of-error standard. The mere fact that the parties 
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disagree as to the meaning of the language contained in the 
policy is not sufficient to create an ambiguity. B.F. Goodrich 
Co. v. Vinvltech Corp., 711 F.Supp. 1513/ 1517 (D. Ariz. 
1989). The first step in our review is to examine the document 
in its entirety and in accordance with its purpose, giving 
effect to all of its parts. Larrabee v. Royal Dairy Prods. 
Co., 614 P.2d 160, 163 (Utah 1980); Regional Sales Agency, 
Inc., 784 P.2d at 1213. 
Following careful review of the title insurance policy 
issued by ATGF, we determine that the Combes* assertions are 
without merit. The policy clearly insures solely B-H, not the 
Combes. The title insurance policy is described throughout as 
the "owners" policy. An executory contract of sale converts 
the interest of the vendor of the real property to personalty. 
Willson v. State Tax Comm'n, 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 P.2d 1298, 
1300 (1972); Cannefax v. Clement, 786 P.2d 1377, 1379-80 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). The vendee acquires the equitable interest in 
the property at the moment the contract is created and is 
treated as the owner of the land. Cannefax, 786 P.2d at 1380; 
Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Thus, viewing the policy in its entirety, we find the 
document's purpose clear: to provide title insurance for the 
owners of the property, Breuer and Harrison. Therefore, the 
trial court properly granted summary judgment for ATGF and 
Froerer on the Combes1 claim under the title policy. 
The Combes also contend that factual issues precluded 
summary judgment of their claim against Froerer and ATGF for 
abstractor's negligence. Some jurisdictions have held that a 
title insurance company has the liability of an abstractor of 
title when it inspects records and prepares title reports. 
Culp Contruction Co. v. Buildmart Mall, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 6 
n.3 (1990); Moore vy Title IhSt COt Of Minnesota, 148 Ariz. 
408, 714 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Ct. App. 1985); £££, e.g.. White v. 
Western Title Ins. Co., 40 Cal. 3d 870, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509, 710 
P.2d 309, 315 (1985); Malinak v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. of 
Idaho, 661 P.2d 12, 14-15 (Mont. 1983); but see Anderson v. 
Title Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 875, 655 P.2d 82 (1982). However, 
the Utah Supreme Court recently adopted the "better-reasoned 
approach" which views preliminary title reports and title 
insurance commitments as M,no more than a statement of the 
terms and conditions upon which the insurer is willing to issue 
its title policy. . . .•H Culp Constr., 137 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
6 (quoting Lawrence v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 192 Cal. App. 3d 
70, 237 Cal. Rptr. 264, 268 (1987). 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not directly 
addressed the issue of tort liability for abstractor 
negligence, but cf. Culp Constr. at 6-7; Bush v. Coult, 594 
P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1979) (title insurance is in the nature of 
70 
a warranty), the tort of negligent misrepresentation against 
third parties to a real estate transaction is clearly 
recognized by the court. See Christenson v. Commonwealth Land 
Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah 1983). In Christenson, 
the supreme court defined negligent misrepresentation as 
follows: 
Where (1) one having a pecuniary interest 
in a transaction, (2) is in a superior 
position to know material facts, and (3) 
carelessly or negligently makes a false 
representation concerning them, (4) 
expecting the other party to rely and act 
thereon, and (5) the other party 
reasonably does so and (6) suffers loss in 
that transaction, the representor can be 
held responsible if the other elements of 
fraud are also present. 
Id.6 (quoting Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 423 
P.2d 659, 662 (1967)). 
In Culp Construction, the supreme court held that a 
title insurance policy does not constitute a representation of 
title, but only acts to insure the described title. Since in 
this case no preliminary report was requested or issued and the 
title policy was not issued until after closing, the Combes did 
not rely upon ATGF's alleged representations. The Combes 
counter that Froerer1s actions led the Combes to believe that 
he had already conducted the title search and issued the title 
policy, and that they had clear, marketable title to the 
property. This representation, however, is unsupported by the 
record. Following careful review, we find that since the 
Combes did not know or even anticipate that Froerer and ATGF 
were going to issue title insurance until the time of closing, 
they did not rely on any representation by Froerer or ATGF that 
a preliminary report had been issued. 
6. The Utah Supreme Court in Christenson determined that a 
title insurance company's acknowledgment of a document that 
incorrectly indicated that certain properties held in escrow 
had unencumbered equity values available as security for 
plaintiff amounted to negligent misrepresentation. This case 
is distinguishable from Christenson. ATGF does not purport to 
act as anything other than a title insurance company, whereas 
the title insurance company in Christenson had assumed 
additional duties as an escrow agent. 
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BIFURCATION OF TRIAL 
The Combes next contend that because the bifurcation 
of the trial was prejudicial to them, it was an abuse of 
discretion, "Severance is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court and, absent abuse of such discretion, will not be 
upset on appeal." Kino v. Barron, 770 P.2d 975, 976 (Utah 
1988); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 21, 42(b). The parties 
stipulated to the amount paid by B-H and the trial court 
received the stipulation as binding upon the parties. 
Consequently, there was only one issue left to be tried: the 
amount of restitution to be paid as determined from the fair 
market value of the property. Since the Combes' claims against 
Froerer and ATGF were irrelevant to the issue of the fair 
market rental value of the property, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in bifurcating the claims and cross-claims 
between the appellees and ordering separate trials. 
CALCULATION OF RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES 
We next address the court's verdict on restitutionary 
damages. The Combes claim the trial court erred in concluding 
that the fair rental value of the property had no relationship 
to its fair market value at its highest and best use. The 
trial court determined that the highest and best use of the 
property in its then present condition was for agricultural 
purposes and, therefore, credited the Combes with yearly rent 
of $1500. Citing Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 P.2d 559, 562 (Utah 
1985), the Combes insist that, as a matter of law, fair rental 
value equals a reasonable return on the market value of the 
property as established by the contract price, and is 
calculated as the annual interest due on the unpaid balance of 
the contract, at the contract rate. According to the Combes' 
expert witness testimony, such calculation would bring a 
reasonable rate of return of $49,350 per year. 
The supreme court in Warner was addressing the trial 
court's determination of seller's damages for buyer's breach of 
an installment contract, as measured, in part, by the fair 
rental value of the property during the period of occupancy. 
The goal in Warner in awarding the seller damages for loss of 
use of the property was to grant a reasonable return on the 
investment. I&. This case, in contrast to Warner, involves 
the buyer's election of rescission for seller's breach of a 
land purchase contract. Rescission is a restitutionary remedy 
which attempts to restore the parties to the status quo to the 
extent possible or as demanded by the equities in the case. 
Ducran v. Jones, 724 P.2d 955, 957 (Utah 1986); see also Potter 
v. Oster, 426 N.W.2d 148, 151 (Iowa 1988). "In the case of a 
rescission, the buyers are entitled to be returned to the 
status quo and to recover the payments made on the contract, 
less the fair rental value of the premises for the time they 
had possession thereof." Ducran, 724 P.2d at 957. 
We find that the trial court correctly determined that 
the expected rate of return on an investment was an 
inapplicable measurement in determining the fair rental value 
of the property for the time B-H had possession. That 
methodology would preclude restoring the parties to their 
positions at the time the contract was executed and would 
provide the Combes with a windfall. We also find that since 
the use of the property for residential purposes is prohibited 
by the pipeline easement problems and it was not so used during 
the contract term, the trial court reasonably determined that 
the highest and best use of the property in question in its 
then present condition was for agricultural purposes. That 
determination was amply supported by the evidence and testimony 
of B-H's expert witness. 
We also reject the Combes' argument that the award of 
prejudgment interest is improper because B-H delayed in 
exercising its rescission rights. See Nielson v. Droubay, 652 
P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah 1982) (a prevailing party who delays 
proceedings may not be awarded prejudgment interest). As we 
have previously noted, any delay was not unreasonable. 
Finally, we agree with the Combes* assertion that the 
trial court miscalculated the rate of prejudgment interest at 
10%, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (1986).7 
7. Section 15-1-1 states in pertinent part: 
(1) Except when parties to a lawful 
contract agree on a specified rate of 
interest, the legal rate of interest for 
the loan or forebearance of any money, 
goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per 
annum. Nothing in this section may be 
construed to in any way affect any penalty 
or interest charge which by law applies to 
delinquent or other taxes or to any 
contract or obligations made before May 
14, 1981. 
The Combes point out that the statutory interest rate in effect 
at the time the contract was executed was at six percent. Utah 
Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (1953). 
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The contract was executed prior to 1981 and therefore/ 
prejudgment interest should accrue at 6% per annum, not 10%. 
SCM Land Co. v. Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d 105, 109 (Utah 
1986). B-H has provided us with no arguments to the contrary. 
Therefore, we remand for a determination of the prejudgment 
interest amount. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we affirm the trial court's granting of 
summary judgment to B-H on its rescission claim against the 
Combes. We also affirm the trial court's determination of the 
fair market rental value of the property and the propriety of 
awarding prejudment interest. However, we reverse and remand 
for recalculation of the prejudgment interest amount at 6% per 
cent per annum instead of 10%. We also reverse and remand on 
the issue of whether an attorney-client relationship existed 
between Froerer and the Combes. If such a relationship is 
found, the Combes may proceed with their legal malpractice 
claim. We affirm the trial court's summary judgment for 
Froerer and ATGF on the contractual and abstractor negligence 
claims and the court's bifurcation of claims against Froerer 
and ATGF.8 
{^<Z&**&c2b> 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Nornran H. Jackson^iJudge 
8. We have considered appellees' suggestion of mootness and 
find it without merit. 
OA 
ORME, Judge (concurring in the result in part, dissenting in part, 
and concurring in part): 
B-H apparently lacked actual notice at least of the 
extent of the waterline easement until well after the purchase 
agreement was entered into. Nonetheless, the easement appeared of 
record and thus B-H "is properly charged with constructive notice" 
of the easement. Callister v. Millstream Assoc, Inc., 738 P.2d 
662, 663 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-2(1) 
(1990). 
In Callister, which concerned a similar contractual 
provision to the effect that title would be conveyed free of all 
liens and encumbrances, with no provision made to exempt easements 
of record or particular classes of easements, we held that the 
buyer's constructive knowledge of the encumbrance was essentially 
irrelevant since it nonetheless "had a contractual right to 
conveyance of title free and clear of all liens . . . ." 738 P.2d 
at 663. Come closing, the seller was unable to clear a 60-unit 
restrictive covenant although it succeeded in substituting for 
it a more advantageous 75-unit restriction. Id., at 664. This 
was not enough. "A 75-unit encumbrance failed to meet the 
requirements of the contract and provided grounds for 
rescission, just as the 60-unit encumbrance would have done." 
Id. We accordingly affirmed the judgment granting rescission. 
In Callister, we were urged to reverse in view of the 
doctrine "that if the purchaser has notice of encumbrances upon 
the property, and the encumbrance is of such a nature that it 
could not be removed by the vendor . . . then the purchaser 
takes possession subject to the encumbrances." 3J!. at 664 
n.6. We held that the authorities relied on by the vendor in 
Callister were distinguishable and did not consider the 
doctrine further. See id. It is noteworthy, however, that the 
restrictive covenant in Callister was not actually "of such a 
nature that it could not be removed by the vendor." On the 
contrary, it was removed, albeit only on the condition that a 
different restriction be substituted. But there is nothing to 
suggest that it could not have been removed altogether, given 
more successful negotiations with adjacent property owners or 
others who had to consent to the change. 
The Combes raise a similar argument here and it is 
undisputed—apparently in view of the gross unfeasibility 
financially and otherwise of rerouting a water district's 
deeply buried water line and accompanying easement around the 
subject property—that the easement in question cannot be 
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removed by the Combes. Although somewhat lukewarm to the 
general notion when I authored Callister, see 738 P.2d at 664 
n.6, I am now persuaded it makes good sense. If a purchaser 
has knowledge of an encumbrance that cannot be removed, and 
enters into a contract calling for conveyance free and clear, 
the entire contract is an exercise in futility unless the 
operative provision be taken to exclude such an encumbrance. 
Otherwise, the purchaser has entered into a contract requiring 
the vendor to do the impossible, which would be nonsensical. 
As a matter of vendor-vendee law, the general 
principle seems to be settled. See 77 Am. Jur. 2d Vendor & 
Purchaser § 120 (1975). However, the rule is otherwise in Utah 
where a warranty deed has actually been given and the question 
about an irremediable encumbrance arises in the context of 
whether the warranty provided in Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-2 (1990) 
has been breached. See Berastrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1125 
(Utah 1984). For the narrow reason that the contract-in this 
case called for delivery of an unrestricted warranty deed, and 
it is appropriate to read the statutory warranty into the key 
contractual provision,1 I concur that the Combes cannot prevail 
under their irremediable encumbrance argument. 
Nonetheless, I would reverse the summary judgment in 
favor of B-H. I believe the five-year delay in asserting a 
rescission right, during which time payments were made and the 
contract was twice amended, necessarily poses a material 
question of fact: Even if some time to assess the situation 
and explore possibilities of mitigation was available to B-H 
after "discovery" of the easement, was five years more than the 
"reasonable time" the law would permit in which to do so? On 
the record before us, I cannot conclude that five years was not 
an unreasonable delay. 
I concur in the court's disposition of who is insured 
under the title policy, but base my conclusion not so much on 
the characterization of the term "owner" as on the fact that 
the purchase agreement anticipated the Combes procuring 
insurance for B-H and the further fact that when both vendor 
1. Stated another way, the Combes would have breached their 
agreement to deliver an unrestricted warranty deed upon 
conveying title subject to the easement and it follows they 
were in anticipatory breach of the contract's requirement for a 
warranty deed by reason of the easement's existence. 
0£ 
and purchaser under a real estate contract are intended to be 
insured under a "title" policy, both are clearly identified as 
insureds, typically with the phrase "as their interests may 
appear." 
I concur in the court's opinion insofar as it treats the 
"abstractor's negligence" claims, the attorney malpractice 
claim, the bifurcation issue, and the interest issue. 
Finally, even assuming the judgment of rescission should 
otherwise be affirmed, I disagree with the court's view of how 
to calculate the offset against payments made for B-H's 
possession of the property for the years between execution of 
the contract and assertion of a right to rescind, which in my 
mind leaves B-H with a substantial windfall. I agree with 
Professor Dobbs, who suggests that in the usual real estate 
restitution case the buyer's claim to interest on the payments 
it gets back, and the seller's claim to the fair rental value 
of the property while it was detained, should be considered a 
"wash." S££ D. Dobbs, Remedies § 12.9 at 846 (1973). This 
approach would work a much fairer result in this case than 
valuing B-H's use of the property at agricultural rental rates, 
not only because the parties' contract fixes a reliable measure 
of its total value (and thus of an imputed rental value) at a 
much higher rate, but also because B-H kept the property tied 
up for so many years during which the Combes were precluded 
from marketing the property to other buyers. The restitution 
decreed in this case does not merely make B-H whole; it gives 
it a hefty profit. 
Gregory^. Orme, Judge 
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